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David R. Harvey1 
 
Abstract 
Repeated calls for interdisciplinary research and communication, both within 
social science and between social, natural and physical scientists, as well as with 
the rest of the world, frequently meet a fundamental problem: there is no 
commonly accepted framework or common language within and through which 
to integrate the largely separate social understandings generated by our social 
sciences. This paper is an attempt to outline a possible framework, in the hope 
that it might stimulate debate about why this conception is wrong or how it is 
incomplete, and so to develop a more generally acceptable common story. 
The premises of this speculation are: social systems exist – there are 
understandable processes by which we live, capable of both theoretical and 
empirical exploration through which to develop better rules and tools for living; 
these social systems evolve by adaptation, invention and replication to better fit 
their contexts and circumstances, through the characters and cultures of people, 
interacting through social transactions. As a consequence, we would expect to 
observe, following the natural world, identifiable phyla of social transactions and 
interactions – a taxonomy of social systems. This taxonomy should be capable of 
retrodiction - plausible explanation of how and why these transactions came to 
be, and how they correspond to contemporary analysis. This conjecture identifies 
a plausible taxonomy and an outline evolutionary story of the emergence of the 
major transactional phyla. 
1 Introduction 
The guiding text for this paper was enunciated over a decade ago by Ralph 
Dahrendorf (1995). “There remains a common theme for a science of human 
society, and that while much progress has been made in developing its various 
facets and aspects, it is still important to try and tie the parts together - not in 
search of a ‘world formula’ but to make sense of the social habitat in which we 
live, have lived and are likely to live.” Yet our professional literature, as social 
scientists, still largely fails to deliver on this challenge, while echoes of 
Dahrendorf’s plea in calls for multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research are 
practically deafening. 
Repeated calls for interdisciplinary research and communication, both within 
social science and between social, natural and physical scientists, as well as with 
the rest of the world, frequently meet this fundamental problem: there is no 
commonly accepted framework or common language within and through which 
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to integrate the largely separate social understandings generated by our social 
sciences. 
There seem to be three major difficulties in the way of effort to produce a 
common theme or story.  Any initial attempt to tell a complete story of social 
interaction is unlikely to achieve even modest acceptance. Reactions will span a 
spectrum from substantial scepticism to outright dismissal. Any initial attempt is 
likely to be regarded as unwisely ambitious to downright futile. It will certainly 
be incomplete, under-researched and ill-situated in the massive existing 
literature. It is little surprise that it has not been attempted. Yet such a story is 
sorely and surely needed. This teller is simply someone sufficiently past realistic 
academic aspiration and sufficiently free of immediate intellectual pressures to 
be prepared to have a go and see what happens. 
The second difficulty is related.2 The present social science community is 
substantially divided about the underlying conceptions of the ways in which our 
worlds work, and hence about the appropriate research strategies and practices to 
pursue in developing our understandings of these workings. In extremely crude 
terms, at one extreme positivists (such as many economists) believe that the 
essential structures and processes of social (at least economic) behaviour are 
well-established, and that appropriate research then consists of elaborating the 
calculus and mechanics of the theory and of testing (or, better, estimating) the 
causative relationships of theory with extensive, and frequently secondary data 
and sophisticated statistical procedures. At the other extreme, relativists believe 
that the essential structures and processes are far more complex and disguised 
than is believed by positivists. As a consequence, theories need to be developed 
on the basis of intensive primary research of actual behaviours and actors, and 
detailed dissection of competing explanations.  
The immediate problem for the present enterprise is that conventional intensive 
scholarship, involving detailed critical analysis of existing literature and close 
examination of specific behaviours and social relations, cannot hope to deliver a 
novel outline metaphysic. Any attempt to tell a coherent story of social 
interaction will appear as irredeemably positivist and assertive, which will 
necessarily alienate some social science traditions. This cannot be helped. 
Furthermore, there will be no conventional empirical research programme (either 
intensive or extensive) which can hope to validate or verify the conjecture. The 
test of it has to be through critical debate and discussion of the concepts and their 
associated implications. If this presents a major challenge to the existing social 
science community, so be it.  
The third major difficulty is that any attempt to tell a general story about our 
societies and their interactions which is founded on a single established social 
science discipline is bound to fail. Members of the chosen discipline, whichever 
it is, will be inclined to accept the argument (within reason) as self-evident, 
while others from the rest of the social science family will almost inevitably 
reject it as failing to include their own insights and intellectual cultures. What is 
needed is a reasonably established and commonly understood framework, 
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without direct affiliation to any one social science discipline, which can be 
plausibly applied to our social interactions.  
The choice here is evolution, to which no major social science discipline yet lays 
claim, and to which natural science already hugely subscribes. As, for example, 
Winter, 1988, notes: “natural selection and evolution should not be viewed as 
concepts developed for the specific purposes of biology and possibly 
appropriable for the specific purposes of economics, but rather as elements of 
the framework of a new conceptual structure that biology, economics and the 
other social sciences can comfortably share.” (p 614).  
However, there is an immediate difficulty with an application of evolutionary 
principles to social systems: ‘natural’ selection clearly does not apply – our 
social systems are human inventions, and are, in that sense, self-selected. Indeed, 
that is their principal function – to select for and condition behaviour patterns 
and responses for best fit with the existing community socio-ecosystem, socio-
political climate and socio-economic environment. The focus of this story is 
these rules, codes, norms and behaviour patterns (alternatively termed cultures or 
institutions depending on the literature), which we use to inform and regulate our 
social interactions. It follows, especially, that this story is not simply socio-
biology (Wilson, 1975) or evolutionary psychology (e.g., Buss, 1995) or another 
attempt at memetics (Dawkins, 1989; Blackmore, 1998), though there are 
obviously echoes of each here. These are important caveats. I do not assert here 
that social evolution mimics biological evolution, other than that it betrays the 
fundamental Darwinian principles of variation, replication and selection, and 
hence persistence of more desirable traits and characteristics at the expense of 
those (contextually and circumstantially) less desirable. We do not need, for this 
story, to pursue the argument so far as to worry about the ‘inheritance’ processes, 
to be side-tracked by wondering what the transmission ‘vehicle’ (meme) is or 
how we might recognise or define it or them, or be mesmerised by the 
distinctions between genotypes and phenotypes, and hence by quarrels about 
whether social evolution is Lamarckian or not (e.g. Hodgson and Knudson, 
2006, or, from a different and also illuminating perspective, Ridley, 2003). 
 
The central question can be phrased in terms of the social science disciplines 
themselves, from anthropology to philosophy, and including psychology, 
sociology, political science, economics, law, education, humanities and the arts. 
How have these apparently separate ‘disciplines’ emerged? Why are they so 
persistent? One plausible answer is that they represent the principal axes of the 
human condition, and reflect the major, even essential elements or phyla of 
human interaction and communication patterns. In short, they can be taken as the 
‘self-evident’ fabric of the common story – the major phyla (or kingdoms) of 
social relations emerging from our social evolution to date. The story, then, 
needs to elaborate the essential connections between them as the potential 
common framework, and to explain (at least in outline) their emergence. 
Section 2 outlines a conceptual framework of the processes of social interaction, 
as a background for consideration of the possible evolution of social transaction 
patterns (Section 3), as the basis for a possible taxonomy.  Section 4 briefly 
discusses some apparent connections between this conjecture and major strands 
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of existing literature, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. A conceptual framework 
The essential social connections are, I assert, self-evident, as human 
communication, discussion, debate, negotiation and transactions – the 
fundamental processes of living in human societies. At the risk of both annoying 
committed post-modernists, and of attempting the impossible, a brief caricature 
of some current positions is that all realities or truths are necessarily social 
constructs.  As such, these constructs are inevitably and continually debated, 
contested, de-constructed and re-constructed.3  Any attempt at a common story, 
from this perspective, is nothing more than a social construct - to be contested 
and debated – exactly as this story should be. Furthermore, the rules and 
conventions according to which the contests are to be judged and the debates 
governed are also social constructs. Reducto ad absurdiam, all we have is 
rhetoric, persuasion and spin (or coercion and oppression), not analysis and 
conviction. 
However, I argue that any workable consensus or synthesis must necessarily 
imply a story of the way the world works - a ‘meta-narrative’ or common theme. 
It is this meta-narrative which provides practical policies, strategies and 
behaviours with their coherence, rationality and legitimacy (or not), and hence 
their capacity for persistence. Any sustainable story is necessarily founded on 
these basic ideas and acceptances of our ‘social truths’.  These truths are North’s 
institutions (North, 1990) - the codes, disciplines and understandings - which our 
societies accept (or not) as the vehicles and arbiters of our behaviours and 
actions.  
Reference to the philosophical literature on the reasonable grounds for truth 
strongly suggests that there are only four fundamental foundations or axes to 
these social truths (e.g, Edwards, 1967, also de Bono, 1995).   First:  what will 
sell to constituents, either through market places or governing councils and 
executives, which establish the accepted rules of societies (correspondence 
theory).  Second, what can be established beyond reasonable doubt through 
logic, reason and science as being near enough for farm work, which establish 
the reason accepted by societies (coherence theory).   Third, what are taken as 
articles of faith, as self-evident truths, the current social dogma or ideology 
(performative theory).  Fourth, the village, urban, or street myth - the habits, 
conventions and conveniences inherited from the past and neighbours (pragmatic 
theory), without direct or explicit reference to the trinity of fundamental 
foundations: rules; reason; faith. 
We persuade and convince ourselves of social truths through social transactions 
and negotiations.  Apart from the basics of cognition and communication, the 
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principal forms of social transactions have been identified by Boulding, (1973), 
echoed by de la Mothe and Paquet (1996) and also, apparently unwittingly, by 
Strange (1994) as: gifts from those who love us; tributes from those who fear us; 
or exchange with those willing to trade with us.  In addition, though, many of our 
social transactions are practically autonomic: governed by habit, routines, 
customs and traditions.  We use these four basic transaction systems in different 
mixes and balances, to govern and organize our businesses and societies. 
These four principal negotiation systems – which I label: consent, coercion, 
contract and convention - are each concerned with social interactions and 
transactions that co-establish accepted practices and expectations of mutual 
behaviours and responses.  Each helps to continually reconstruct working 
concepts of social truth - as a common view of the ways the world works, 
without which our social worlds cannot work or play.  
The consent transaction system involves informal social interactions, carried out 
on the basis of trust or faith in our friends and neighbours, as well as the reason 
from our own intellect (the head) and the rules of emotional empathy (the 
heart).4 Convention captures the more formal social rules and rulers which 
communities and societies establish through political interaction, which become 
enshrined in the various forms of ‘ocracy we develop to manage our public or 
collective affairs: plutocracy, autocracy, theocracy, and finally, perhaps in 
despair with all the rest, democracy, and all the bureaucracies that are associated 
with them.  As far as democracy is concerned, this transaction system is founded 
on faith in the democracy, the reason of rhetoric and debate, and the rule of the 
majority. Coercion applies the force of law to enshrine the most salient of our 
social contracts and behaviours in formal codes, based on faith in the legislature, 
the rule of the law and the reason of jurisprudence and the courts.  It is this 
transaction system that ultimately defines and identifies the state (Dunn, 1999). 
Contract is at the heart of our economic transactions systems – the basis of trade, 
specialisation and comparative advantage, based on faith in self-interest and the 
resulting invisible hand, the reason of economic logic (including rational 
ignorance) and the rule of the market. 
Each of these transaction systems is founded on and defined according to its 
reliance on the three cornerstones of faith, rule and reason.  Unless agreeably 
based on these pillars, I suggest that any society or community will eventually 
question and undermine the social organizers through which we generate 
consensus and social authority.  The balance of reliance among the cornerstones 
shapes the organizing plane or negotiating agenda of each transaction system. . 
The reflection and refraction of these four cognitive planes (agenda) on the 
ground where we live then forms our socially constructed vernacular. We use 
this ‘consensus’ to breed and grow our institutions - our social codes, realities 
and authorities. And central to the construction of our acceptable social truths, 
and the authority they exert on our behaviours, is a commonly accepted idea or 
story. Without the organising power of this constructed idea (or an ideology), 
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embodied in a personality or an organization and shared between source and 
subjects, any authority (of person, office or organization) is ultimately empty.  
However, the particular characters and the ancestories (or cultures) of our 
communities and societies will affect the ways in which we construct our social 
realities.  So, too, will the contexts and circumstances in which we find 
ourselves, as the product of our own unique histories, and the accidents of our 
geographies.  These ever-changing four Cs (character, culture, context and 
circumstance) will cloud and obscure the essential systemic, so the picture 
implies a continual reconsideration and reconstruction of our vernacular 
authorities. Furthermore, the orientations of these concepts depend on the 
weights we attach to the three principal cornerstones of truth, and on the extent 
to which we need or wish to engage in the principal transaction types (our 
involvements). Our own weights and involvements breed and nurture our 
predispositions towards particular versions of our social truths.  And, life replies, 
can we persist and survive without adapting and adjusting our perceptions and 
preconceptions of these truths?  
Governance and social constructions. 
The way in which human societies reconcile individual and group perceptions 
and ambitions is typically through some form of government. Governments exist 
to exercise social authority. Governance, in contrast, is how we choose our 
governors; not only how we erect our authorities and elect our leaders, but also 
how we breed and cultivate our ideas and institutions - our social selection 
criteria and rules for behaviour. We need and breed governance, and develop 
governments to achieve a sustainable balance between private (individual) and 
public (or social) interests, where each interacts with the other. In this story, we 
are, at bottom, driven by gilt (self-interest) and guilt (public interest), which may 
be simply gilt with a you in it.  Our human free will consists essentially in 
making this collective choice.5 And, the richer we become, the greater the scope 
and responsibility we have for this choice (Margolis, 1982). 
Self-interest can be roughly characterised by the simplistic Maslow hierarchy: 
physiological; safety and security; belonging.6 Social science literature is more 
reticent about a corresponding characterisation of public or social needs.7 
                                                 
5
  In this conception, in contrast to much of the present debates, human free will is an 
emergent property of community and society – it makes no sense in isolation, and cannot 
be identified within the biophysical constructs of our individual brains and minds. It only 
emerges as a consequence of the social interaction. 
6
  The Maslow hierarchy is frequently regarded as overly simplistic.  However, it suffices 
here for illustration of the argument. For a discussion of the psychological understandings 
of egotistical needs and self-interest , see, for example, Steers et al., 1996, p 13ff. 
7
  The social psychology literature does deal extensively with ‘helping behaviours’, though 
these explorations are typically restricted to individual behaviours and actions towards 
other specific individuals, rather than with a generic notion of the public good or interest. 
However, Banyard and Hayes (1994, p 477) note that  “there is a growing body of 
evidence which suggests that altruism may be an important and frequent form of social 
behaviour which serves to ensure social cohesion”, while Margolis (1982) develops an 
economical theory of altruism, and Frank (1988) explores the roles of passion and 
emotion in shaping our transactions. 
A Conjecture on the Nature of Social Systems 
6 
Strange (op cit.) asserts four fundamental social goals:  wealth, security, 
freedom, justice.  However, her conception seems to mix aspirations and 
ambitions with underlying needs, motives and processes.  The security and 
stability of a social system is inherently dependent on the processes used to 
achieve balance between private and public interest, and on the capacity of the 
system to resist internal fracture and external threat.  In turn, freedom has to do 
with the extent to which private interests are given free rein within the social 
system.  Since the fundamental role of (collective) free will is to achieve a 
sustainable balance between private and public interest, it seems sensible to 
characterise the goals of governance directly as a balance between the two (again 
following Margolis, 1982). 
Efficiency and effectiveness (the primary focus of mainstream economics) is a 
basic or primitive social need, if not a natural inclination.  Once secured, 
however, our history suggests that we become more concerned about justice and 
equity, if only to assure the reproduction of our society without major internal 
fracture, about which our current formal economics has nothing to say (although 
it is not unreasonable to assert that these concerns are at the heart of Marx’s 
analysis).  Indeed, it is these concerns, and our beliefs that we can and should do 
something about them, that fundamentally distinguish us from our animal 
cousins and ancestors. The naive economic assumption that allocation questions 
can be divorced from issues of distribution, though powerful, is a well-known 
and critical shortcoming of conventional economic policy analysis and 
management strategy.  
Over and above justice, we become concerned about sustainability and 
coherence, as reflected in present heightened anxiety over the long-run 
sustainability of human organizations and exploitation of the planet’s limited 
resources and waste-disposal capacity, not to mention our continued search for 
the meaning of it all - for a more common model. Our social goals, as Strange’s 
quartet of wealth, security, freedom and justice, can thus be seen as the 
harmonious and simultaneous satisfaction of both self and public interests.  
Human progress, such as it is, can now be pictured as the growth along these two 
axes, and of the associated field between them, over which we choose and 
continually adapt our governance systems. We can return to this basic 
framework after considering the nature of our essential social transaction 
patterns, and some supporting evidence from the literature.  
Against this outline framework of social transaction processes, the present 
conjecture depends on how our principal transactions systems and structures 
came to exist and persist. 
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3. An Outline evolution of social institutions.8 
Is there a plausible story of how we came to use four principal transactions 
systems (institutions), and are there others which this outline has forgotten or 
ignored? The answers, according to the conceptual logic suggested here, lies in 
the evolutionary history of our human societies. 
Following and developing Capra, 1996 (see, also, Deutsch, 1997) evolution 
happens in phases.  Each phase consists of a set of principles or motive forces 
underlying the observable structures and patterns of the community or ecosystem 
- the society types and associated transaction systems (communism, capitalism, 
tribal or feudal systems etc.) as the phyla or kingdoms of institutional forms - 
with an evolutionary process operating to explain the progress from one phase to 
the next.  Some now believe we are at such a cusp of institutional evolution (as 
argued, for example, by Fukuyama, 1992, 1995a).  But substantiation of this 
claim requires a conjecture as to the natural progression of institutional phases.  
I begin at the beginning of human life as we now know it, to identify the 
evolutionary taxonomy of principles and the phyla of institutional forms as we 
trace our apparent history.  The methodology employed is reverse engineering - 
deducing the principal elements and linkages from what we observe as the 
successful (and thus surviving) institutional forms. 
Living systems and Human systems 
Capra (op. cit.) differentiates living from inanimate systems by observing that 
the individuals which comprise living systems mind about and respond to what 
happens to them, whereas non-living things simply exist and react with their 
environments.  Living systems thus adjust and adapt to their surroundings and 
generate an evolutionary system as a consequence. The principles through which 
evolution happens are survival (persistence) and replication.  The structures are 
the species which emerge as being best fitted to the changing environment and 
habitats.  Human life is, according to this fundamental description, no different 
from other forms of life. 
But human life not only minds about and responds to what happens to it; it cares 
about and replies to what happens to it - Max Weber’s position in a nutshell (e.g. 
Gerth and Mills, 1946; see, also, Swedberg, 1998).  Caring implies at least a 
primitive love for fellows (and its natural antonym - hate) and some 
corresponding if rudimentary belief or value systems - a proactive rather than 
simply responsive process, stemming from a perception of ‘self’ as distinct from 
‘other’, and a corresponding recognition of others’ existence, rights and 
responses. Roles become established amongst members of a tribe and 
relationships are formed, with rights, responsibilities and duties assigned and 
habitualised at each social level in the tribe. Social values thus emerge and 
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become codified in the emergent phenomenon of the myths of early religions and 
tribal customs.   
The innate and autonomic rules of biological survival and reproduction thus 
become augmented by conceptual codes and conducts, founded on belief. Our 
early ancestors simply could not have survived and prospered (as they obviously 
did) in a fundamentally capricious and frequently antagonistic environment 
without both self-belief and, as a necessary consequence, social (and 
environmental) belief and trust (even if these are restricted to believing nature or 
other tribes to be incurably malign). We humans are naturally and irrevocably 
dogmatic - that is how we began. We may label this early stage of institutional 
evolution as a tribe for convenience, which can be imagined as our ancestral 
hunter-gatherer villages and communes.  It is, therefore, our most primitive and 
deeply ingrained institution, largely based on belief, and is one to which societies 
are likely to revert, if and when more advanced institutions fail. 
However, caring and replying is not sufficient to distinguish human life from 
higher forms of animal life. Higher animals are also sentient in that they are able 
to distinguish between ‘self’ and ‘other’ in at least a rudimentary way. Dogmatic 
dogs are commonplace. Clearly human and intelligent life has moved beyond 
simply caring and replying, to develop cognition - conscious knowledge and 
understanding, and associated communication and interrogation. Cognition 
involves recognising social and natural environments and relating to and with 
this recognition through the development of inferential beliefs about ourselves, 
our societies and our environments.  We humans are therefore also naturally 
reasonable and reasoning - that is how we began to grow up. 
The conscious inference and cognition necessary for this recognition are more 
obviously special human characteristics, reflected in human brain to brawn 
ratios. From such conscious thought and its application to the local environment 
emerged the early cultivator community, as opposed to their predecessors, the 
hunter-gatherer tribes. With cultivation apparently comes a near-necessary 
development of specialisation of function and trade between members of the 
community. The intuitive but conscious acceptance of Adam Smith’s invisible 
hand becomes embodied in community relationships and tolerance of 
distinctions, roles and hierarchies, and commitment to the associated 
responsibilities and socio-psychological contracts - barter, in short.  The 
economics of the self-sufficient peasant families and villages has long been 
recognised as a natural embodiment of our economical general equilibrium 
theory (see, e.g. Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995, ch.6).  In effect, inferential reason 
is used to develop new rules, which may then become enshrined in dogma for the 
purposes of training, taming and civilising the emerging human population. 
Human institutional evolution 
Recognisably human institutions thus emerge. Re-cognition (sic.) of the 
processes of human system development requires that the participants at least 
submit to the implicit or intuitive rationale of these systems, consciously 
adapting and adjusting their behavioural relations to best fit this apparent (but 
not yet articulate) rationale. Recognition and relation thus leads to charity in 
these community relations and specialisations - as the conscious and cognitive 
acceptance of the capacity of the community and its practices to be benign and 
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welfare-improving (or the exact opposite - malevolent and welfare-threatening, 
thus requiring substantive and cognitive opposition).  
Thus civility emerges as the glue binding (or fracturing) communities into 
societies, in which each knows their place and understands their roles, rights, 
responsibilities and duties towards the other members of the society, with charity 
(or its antonym - intolerance or bigotry) as the fundamental motivation of this 
phase. The second rung of the invisible hand mechanism is now in place - 
acceptance through mutual respect for the activities of others as being in the 
community as well as personal interest (see, e.g. Bromley, 1997). Thus, by 
adolescence, the human race has become charitable, social and civilised, as well 
as dogmatic and reasonable. 
Without some pressure of relative scarcity of resource (or of some social 
ambition plus faith in capacity to expand) recognition and relationships seem 
likely to be a dominant institutional form - our early ancestral tribal cultivators. 
Our apparently innate curiosity might be the only drive to further development.  
Indulgence in curiosity, though, is risky and requires some considerable security 
and relative prosperity. However, scarce resources will augment this natural or 
paternal curiosity, and mate it with maternal necessity, to produce invention.9  
Invention is necessarily associated with rationalisation of the way things are and 
to the emergence of conjectural reason about how things could be different.  In 
so doing, our ancestors begin to make things different, inventing and 
reconstructing their tools and rules - institutions, organisations, habitats and 
environments.  We now have a recognisably different sort of community, which 
we might label a society, reflecting the particular character of this stage in 
institutional evolution as embodying more organised and conscious association 
than the parental forms: the tribes and communities.  Human history provides 
ample evidence of this phase of institutional evolution, strongly suggesting that 
rationalisation and reason can only take root and thrive in well-established 
(mature) and relatively secure communities, requiring sustained self-belief and 
considerable common understanding as preconditions. Otherwise, societies 
collapse to communities and tribes - the “Dark Ages”. 
The birth and development of the (western) “common model” 
Once rationalisation and reason emerge to provide for control over the human 
condition and circumstance, societies naturally develop strong hopes and 
expectations for their future development and operation. Invention is now 
additionally spurred by ambitions for further growth.  These expectations 
embrace not only likely futures given current conditions and community actions, 
but also include an increasing number of possible or virtual alternatives. The 
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natural consequence is for such societies to become fragmented and specialised 
as groups begin to develop their own comparative advantages and pursue their 
own ambitions or virtual realities. Or, in the event that they cannot realise their 
ambitions here, they exit from their parent societies and start again somewhere 
else: colonies are born. And they learn, perhaps too slowly, to trade with rather 
than fight one another.  Our society has now evolved to a recognisable market 
economy, expecting and relying on outcomes as a consequence of contracts and 
formal exchange; specialising and trading (again echoing Adam Smith and 
Weber, see Swedberg, op. cit.). 
But, the long arm of the law is necessarily attached to the invisible hand: to 
enforce contracts, protect property rights and outlaw theft.  Economies need and 
breed government, at the very least to provide for and enforce common law.  
Furthermore, when measured against the criteria of the earlier institutional 
forms, market re-distributions of income, wealth and social power are frequently 
judged unjust, especially by those whose previous power-base is being eroded by 
the growth of the market economy.  Expectations of the powerful turn out to be 
ill-judged and reliance misplaced according to the previous institutional habits. 
As Bromley (op. cit.) remarks (p 1386): “The necessary institutional 
arrangements underlying a viable market economy reminds us that shared values 
and norms of a particular society are the necessary precursors to such 
institutional arrangements.” The evolutionary progression now becomes more or 
less consciously self-selected, since the power to decide in the public interest is 
now explicitly conceded to the state. The law, on which our economy is co-
founded, will be required to extend its ambit to include both politically 
determined re-distributions, and to manage the economy to correct for market 
failures and malfunctioning in the public interest.10 
The inevitable tension between the market and the state - spawns ‘ocracies 
The process of collective decision-making breeds a new institutional form - the 
‘ocracy: autocracy, plutocracy, theocracy, bureaucracy, and perhaps finally, 
democracy, when all the previous efforts have been tried and found wanting. 
Necessary failure to win control over market conditions (enforced by the 
conditions of competition) for suppliers will inevitably lead to these ambitions 
for control being pursued through the political machinery of the state. Here, the 
marginal net returns to political action for suppliers are necessarily more 
concentrated than for consumers, because of specialisation in production.  
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  Here, we need to be careful about the meanings of the words ‘state’ and ‘government’ 
(Bromley, private correspondence). The previous institutional forms of tribe, community and 
society all manifest some form of government or governance, and frequently exhibit forms of 
collective power that can be labelled as states. However, until an economy develops to generate a 
‘self-made’ power base, the legitimacy of previous states rests on some faith in god, lineage, or 
natural authority, including historical accumulation of brute power.  The emergence of 
substantial economic power, however, forces societies to judge between this self-made power 
and the ancestral and apparently exogenous sources of leadership and social control. The term 
‘state’ is used here to encapsulate this emergent phenomenon of explicit and conscious collective 
judgement of the public interest (e.g. Dunn, 1999).  This is in contrast to the term ‘government’, 
which we can interpret to represent the more easily observable implementation apparatus of this 
collective judgement. 
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Consumer dominion over the market place is thus over-ridden by producer (or 
factor ownership) domination of public intervention in the name of fair and just 
distribution or of prudent economic management.  
It follows that income distribution under any political economy general 
equilibrium, even under ideal competitive conditions, will be determined by 
political influence and authority, typically manifesting as an uneasy balance 
between the owners of capital and of labour.  Right and left are thus natural 
manifestations of state politics.  The former is predisposed to believe in the 
supremacy of the market, which apparently generates the factor incomes.  Paid 
labour (and atomistic sectors such as agriculture), on the other hand, find 
themselves governed by the apparently capricious markets and avaricious 
capitalists and seek remedy through the political system.  Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem demonstrates that such systems, even if defined as perfectly as possible, 
will frequently generate inconsistent public preferences, and will thus cycle, 
depending on rhythms of conviction amongst (especially) the labour 
constituency of the social desirability of unrestrained markets, and on the 
political control over the negotiating agenda. 
The supremacy of the governed market system over other forms of institutional 
arrangement requires that political constituencies remain convinced of that 
supremacy.  If the market fails to perform according to commonly held opinions 
of justice, fairness and equity, then it will not be politically legitimised, and 
political action and intervention will necessarily undermine the social optimality 
of the market mechanism. The result, then, is an inevitable and concrete mixture 
of economy, re-enforced by the state and bound together with the glue of 
‘ocracy. 
Thus, there are two conceptually distinct institutional forms bound together in a 
complex we typically label ‘government’. First, as Dunn (1999) observes: 
“coercion is the core of states.”   And, for the coercion to be acceptable to the 
governed, and thus be sustainable and persistent enough to spawn offspring, the 
coercion must be responsive to the collective demands of the population.  It is 
these motives which underpin the ‘ocracies under which we choose to live. 
Democracy apparently becomes inevitable, albeit serviced (or abused) by 
bureaucracies, plutocracies and autocracies pretending to be democratic or to 
service popular or special interests (see, e.g. Kuran, 1995).    
But, equal first, populations must also agree to concede superior power to the 
state, and respect this power above all others.  Human conventions are invented 
to command respect for this concession, to replace the earlier authorities of 
lineage, gods and nature itself.  Our present (and predominantly western) 
“common model” is thus founded on contract, coercion and convention.11 
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  You may object that consent is also included in the common model - that being the point 
of universal suffrage and democratic control.  But convention is a more accurate 
description of our present democratic transaction systems. The ubiquitous resort to 
pressure groups, protests and social disobedience are the exact responses to be expected 
from a lack of general consent or to the means of continually generating and granting it.  
If such protest does not reflect a widespread lack of consent, then it will not command 
sufficient popular support to be tolerated.  Yet it is not obviously withering; the very 
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The present condition of the common model. 
Much of the frustration with our modern mixed economies stems from the 
realisation, conscious or not, that nothing serious can be changed in this complex 
without bringing into question major adjacent and related parts.  Institutional 
change and progress tends to ossify for fear of the genuine uncertainty of real 
change.  Consequently, public relations and presentation takes over from public 
participation and substance.  As Arrow predicts, we go round in circles, while 
bemoaning the logic of the vortex.  We revert, naturally, to earlier forms of 
social institutions - the tribes, communities and societies of our ancestry, but re-
dressed and re-formed to fit with the state-economy-democracy triad.   
This, it seems, is as neat and concise an explanation as yet exists in the 
exploding literature of the twin features of our now near-global common model - 
globalisation of market/state/law systems and fragmentation of societies and 
communities into tribes.  We either submit meekly to the ruling hegemony, or 
demand that it takes better care of our own cherished aspirations and necessarily 
special interests.  Meanwhile, we claim the right to our individualities and 
peculiarities as enshrined in both democratic and consumer sovereignty 
principles.  
A conjecture on Necessary and Sufficient conditions for Institutional 
Sustainability 
The brief parables of the previous paragraphs can be seen as an outline of the 
necessary conditions for successful human civilisations.  They seem to contain 
the essence of much of what we currently observe and of the events and debates 
(including wars and empires) of our history.  In essence, they repeat Fukuyama’s 
(1992, 1995a) argument of “the end of history?”  However, the ‘motor of 
historical change’ as outlined here is clearly incomplete.  It leaves out much 
from what we observe.  Nor can it be regarded as sufficient for sustainable 
success, as any intelligent, informed and rational contemplation of our current 
condition testifies.  To identify the sufficient conditions, it is necessary to pursue 
the evolutionary parable of institutional and social development beyond these 
necessary (or historically observed) stages.  What might our possible futures 
look like? 
More sensibly, since evolution (as a chaotic system) is inherently unpredictable: 
what would we like our future to look like? If we can agree on a desirable future, 
it might be possible to cultivate it. We can conceive, in principle, of governing 
institutions and practices which could, if appropriately framed and implemented, 
convert the community population to reverence rather than mere respect for their 
governments, and thus to their practically unanimous assent to common 
governance of our lives and futures. This must be the goal of those who espouse 
and champion the common model. Otherwise, such systems will continue to 
generate retaliation and conflict both within and between communities, well 
evidenced in our current condition.  The search for a unique and unambiguous 
common model against which all human behaviours can be judged and governed 
                                                                                                                                   
opposite.  If we are not sufficiently antagonised by our conventions to be antipathetic to 
them, we lapse into apathy, which is a chronic condition of our present conventional 
democracies. One cross, on one piece of paper, once every four years or so, hardly 
qualifies as a transaction system for consent. 
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thus becomes the social grail. When found, it might provide the foundation for a 
genuine meritocracy.  Furthermore, having found it, our meritocracy would need 
to develop to an empire to be sustainable, as rightly feared by many social 
commentators. 
But, consider the world which some apparently seek - one in which there is 
universal assent to a more common model. Such unanimity, even if achievable, 
could not be stable. As people devote time and energy to contemplation rather 
than the mundane issues of survival and prosperity, so the community’s 
institutions and practices will be questioned and intelligent thought and re-
search will be undertaken, in the hope of discovery of more generally beneficial, 
acceptable and sustainable rules and procedures.  
Such research and question will now be directed towards social institutions and 
rules rather than physical and biological support systems, resources or tools. As 
such, it necessarily undermines, or at least questions the conventions of the 
revered government, market and legal systems.  The evolutionary process has 
made our institutions ever more massive, thus requiring ever more effort and 
trauma to shift or change.  In turn, these present systems can only be sustained 
through the imposition of particular ideologies and principles on the associated 
constituencies by current leaders and rulers. These people and their 
congregations will necessarily defend and protect their local power-bases to 
ensure their own continuation.  Institutional research or thought which does not 
fit with existing ideologies will tend to be resisted, under-funded and ridiculed, 
or worse. 
However, it is possible to suppose an ideal, though dynamic, outcome in which 
the population can become convinced that all is for the best in this best of all 
possible worlds. In such an idealised state, one can imagine a fully committed 
population, willingly and enthusiastically merging their own self-interests with 
those of the community in near unanimous harmony - the communist ideal in a 
nutshell.  Obviously, this condition is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
achieve. 
However, suppose that we could achieve it. A penultimate phase of institutional 
evolution then becomes possible, in which a significant fraction of the 
population engages in creative imagination of how things might be even better 
and more harmonious, and is engaged in continual re-creation of the community 
and its environments, with the full support and commitment of the whole 
community in these endeavours. Such societies could reasonably be described as 
being driven by the pursuit of fun - where imagination and re-creation appear as 
scholarship or as play.  A genuine civilisation would then be born. The 
conversion of an empire to a civilisation is clearly not easy. 
The end result might be one in which the whole community is convinced and 
assured of the benevolence of their world - not as the best of all possible, but as 
capable of building and growing the best of all possible - secure in the 
knowledge and understanding of they ways in which their worlds work 
compared with all the possible ways in which it could work, and completely self-
assured that they and their community can continue to develop and improve their 
lives indefinitely.  In short, such societies can be characterised as having a 
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common faith in the ultimate benevolence of their communities and in the 
‘fitness’ of their world views, and an associated freedom to doubt (and hence 
question and seek to change) the rules, rulers and power-bases, in the common 
belief and trust that such activity will be regarded as perfectly legitimate, 
respectable and socially benevolent.  
Not that there will be unanimous consent that the ultimate has yet been achieved, 
but unanimous consent that the principles and practices of the community 
systems in conjunction with all its associated environments is both capable of 
moving towards this state of perfect harmony, and that the whole population is 
committed to this pursuit above all others - in short careful charity.  We could, 
perhaps, label such an institution as a sustainable culture (or a mirage). 
Summary Conjecture on the Processes of Institutional Evolution 
A More Common Model 
Table 1 re-capitulates and summarises the ‘natural’ progression of social 
evolution proposed here - a taxonomy of the essential mechanisms of conscious 
institutional design - a more common story. The central proposition is that our 
history, and thus also our future, is explainable as an evolutionary process.  
There is an identifiable pattern to the flow of our evolutionary institutional 
history.  The structures generated by these flows are identified as the archetypal 
institutional form of each phase.  The principles governing its operation are the 
major characters, responses and motives of people and their communities in each 
phase, which govern our social choices.  The local process of each phase is 
identified as the result - which generates the archetypal negotiation or transaction 
system as the pattern of each phase.  In the final column of the table, each phase 
is associated with its ‘natural’ social science discipline. 
Table 1 A Conjecture of the natural taxonomy of institutional 
evolution 
Institution 
Type 
Character Response Result Transaction 
System 
Motives Discipline 
Natural Mind  Neglect Respond 
React 
Adapt & 
Adjust 
Food & gene 
chains 
Life 
(death) 
Ecology 
Tribe Care  
Fight 
Reply 
Retaliate 
Hunt &  
Gather 
Consent 
(sentient) 
Love 
(hate) 
Anth’pology 
Community Recognise  
Ignore 
Relate  
Tolerate 
Cultivate & 
Tame 
Cognition 
(Investigative) 
Inference 
(instinct) 
Psychology 
Society Rationalise 
Reject 
Reason 
Refute 
Invent & 
Reconstruct 
Care 
(Social) 
Charity 
(bigotry) 
Sociology 
Economy Expect 
Exit 
Rely 
Re-Invent 
Specialise 
& Trade 
Contract 
(Enterprising) 
Barter 
(autarchy) 
Economics 
‘Ocracy Coerce 
Submit 
Demand 
Revere 
Institute & 
Regulate 
Coercion 
(Conventional) 
Fear 
(security) 
Law 
State Concede 
Lead 
Respect 
Reign 
Govern & 
Preach 
Convention 
(Realistic) 
Habit 
(anarchy) 
Politics 
Empire Question 
Accept 
Re-search 
Test 
Exhort & 
Display 
Commitment 
(Curious) 
Hope 
(despair) 
Humanities 
Civilisation Imagine 
Play 
Re-create 
Teach 
School & 
Train 
Curiosity 
(Artistic) 
Fun 
(spite) 
Education 
Culture Believe 
Doubt 
Trust 
Legitimise 
Commune  
& Cohere 
Charity 
(Aesthetic) 
Faith 
(distrust) 
Aesthetics 
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Three major disciplines are missing from this table - Philosophy, Theology, 
Science.12  Philosophy is the study of rationality of cognition, inference and 
concept - and thus is the all-embracing discipline.  If philosophy departments are 
shut, the lights go out and the heat of enquiry dissipates to entropy.  Both science 
and theology are the social implementation of philosophy.  If science is shut 
down, the motors of human (as opposed to animal) life support systems die; 
unless theology takes its place. 
The rows of Table 1 could be interpreted as the primary institutional types or 
phyla.  Each can be thought of as a ‘conceptual organism’, consisting of 
interactive and mutually supporting systems of motivations, transactions, 
characteristics and responses, embracing and defining an underlying idea of 
social cohesion. As such each is capable, within limits, of independent 
recognition and taxonomy.  However, like their biological analogues, all will 
exhibit local variation over both time and space, while none is actually capable 
of independent existence.  Each relies on the other for its continued sustenance 
and reproductive capacity, and is modified according to its local circumstance 
and context - its local culture. The proto-typical institutional evolutionary cycle 
exhibits as a full circle.  The careful charity of the ‘last’ phase underpins the 
‘foundation’ phase of human cognitive and institutional evolution - the love, care 
and reply phase of the early tribes, generating the necessary consent to 
community and society.  There is no beginning or end to this cycle; there is no 
first or last step to human happiness. The end of history is necessarily also the 
end of future. There is only a meta-process offering progress towards more 
complete lives and worlds; threatening to malfunction or dissipate into chaos 
when the tolerances of each phase are exceeded without the necessary 
foundations and counter-balances of the ‘parental’ and ‘descendent’ phases being 
in place.   
4 Reflections on existing conditions and literature 
Table 1 identifies the four key motives mentioned above (love, barter, fear and 
habit) but adds a further four (over and above the human preconditions of life 
and conscious inference). Of these, fun is probably uncontroversial as a 
fundamental motive for human behaviour. Pervin, 1993, for example, identifies 
the prime axes of personality in terms of how individuals react to unfamiliar 
circumstances, which correspond very closely to this taxonomy. It is also of 
interest that the archetypal transaction systems identified in Table 1 correspond 
closely with Holland’s (1973, 1985) characterisation of peoples’ attributes in 
relation to appropriate ‘job fits’ (noted in parenthesis in the transaction system 
column).  Holland’s archetypes have proved remarkably robust in providing 
useful recruitment service (see, e.g. Furnham, 1992, especially 104ff). The 
taxonomy suggested here indicates that there are two missing archetypes - 
curious and aesthetic.  Thus, a proposition - inclusion of these two would 
improve the Holland characterisation of ‘occupation space’. 
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  History, as the study of the changing contexts within which societies and its people 
evolve, and Geography, as the study of the circumstantial effects and consequences of the 
social evolution, are seen here as enabling disciplines, rather than as fundamental 
reflections of social transaction systems. As such, and in common with planning and 
archaeology, such disciplines are already inherently multi-disciplinary, but lack a 
common story. 
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However, there may well be more quarrel over the final three motives:  faith, 
hope and charity, at least amongst those not convinced of St. Paul’s recipe for 
human happiness. To echo and reflect the foundations of the social truths with 
which I began this conjecture, we need charity in our rules, lest we be mistaken; 
hope in our reason, that it is both veracious and valid; and faith in our beliefs 
about the way the world works.  On this basis, the underpinning predispositions 
to form societies (expressed as personality traits) might indeed have become  
‘hard-wired’ in our genes rather than continually learned in our memes.13 
There are two major strands of literature which appear to be closely related to 
this conjecture. The first, pioneered by Hofstede (e.g., 2001), on the basis of 
extensive empirical research, proposes that different cultures solve their 
fundamental social problems of harmonising personal and social ambitions, with 
their associated attributions and transaction system mixes, in identifiably 
different ways. Hofstede detects five principal axes of cultural difference, where 
differences can be measured according to the balance particular societies chose 
along these principal axes.  The axes are: individual/collective, the major axis 
suggested here, and, as noted by Hofstede “positioning itself between these poles 
is a very basic problem all societies face” (op cit., pxx); uncertainty avoidance 
(the extent to which society tries to control for or guard against the unknown and 
uncontrollable); power distance (the degree of inequality the society is prepared 
to accept and expect); male/female (a major emotional dimension of society’s 
accepted practices); long term/short term (the extent to which society accepts 
delayed gratification of ambitions and is prepared to be patient and wait).  The 
suggestion here is that these differences actually manifest through different 
framings and mixes of the basic social transaction systems.  
The second major strand, brought to my attention by a reviewer of an earlier 
draft, is the development of grid-group cultural theory, pioneered by Mary 
Douglas and by Mike Thompson and his colleagues. Mamadouh (1999) has 
provided an easily accessible, useful and critical introduction, while the 
companion papers in this source (which she introduces and previews) amply 
illustrate the scope and application of the theory. We clearly agree that culture 
matters, and also that we should expect to observe some identifiable patterns to 
our social organisations and behaviours. The principal argument of the grid-
group theory is that there are a limited number of viable (persistent) cultures (as 
social organisations and behaviour patterns), commonly identified as four (or 
possibly five), labelled by Thompson et al (1990, p 8) as: fatalism; hierarchy, 
(autonomy); individualism; egalitarianism.  However, Mamadouh (op cit) argues 
that “cultural types (ways of life, cultures, rationalities or solidarities) have been 
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  Incidentally, it is widely commented that lack of trust is an important problem for modern 
institutions, which generally substantially increases transaction costs and the probability 
of transaction failures (e.g. Fukuyama, 1995b). Yet trust seems an extremely elusive 
concept. In this story, trust appears as an emergent phenomenon or response only at the 
climax of the evolutionary progression, itself only sustainable given the continuation of 
the supporting phases of evolutionary development, encapsulated in the present operations 
and patterns of social behaviour. Its elusiveness is inherent in its character as an emergent 
phenomenon - not deducible from its constituent parts.  Its essential character is 
fundamentally dependent on both its breeding and its nurture. 
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defined as viable combinations of social patterns and cultural patterns, but it is 
now common to distinguish three levels of analysis instead of two: (1) 
interpersonal relations, (2) cultural biases, and (3) behavioural strategies. It 
underlines the freedom of each individual to choose a strategic behaviour that 
fits the social environment, the cultural bias or both, or to choose a strategic 
behaviour that disrupts the social environment, discredits the cultural bias or do 
both. Although the cultural map portrays dimensions of the social environment, 
descriptions of the cultural types generally blur the analytical distinction 
between patterns of interpersonal relations, cultural biases and behavioural 
strategies. This is also reflected in the labels used to name the types.” (p. 400) 
I suggest that it is not inconsistent with at least some versions of cultural theory 
that individualism and contract, and hierarchy and convention, are closely 
similar in their conceptions, while fatalism could be interpreted as being similar 
to consent, in that this transaction system in the present conjecture is pre-
conditioned by an acceptance of the autonomous power of nature, and a capacity 
to cope with these external forces and constraints. Egalitarianism, however, is 
more problematic for this conjecture. It appears to imply a combination of care 
and charity (Table 1), which in turn implies an aspirational quality to the cultural 
type.  
However, the potential correspondence between this conjecture and gird-group 
culture theory can, perhaps, be clarified by returning to the framework outlined 
above (section 2), and relating the governance field explicitly to the transactions 
systems employed, Figure 1 portrays, in stark simplicity, the final conjecture of 
this paper. 
As argued above (section 2), the primary field over which our social transactions 
systems operate is the resonance or reconciliation field between individual (self) 
and collective (social) aspirations and ambitions. The nine primary, conceptually 
distinct but interrelated transactions systems suggested here have different 
capacities to resonate private with public interests. In particular, those which 
dominate the western common hegemony (contract, coercion and convention), 
are (I suggest) constitutionally incapable of securing wealth, freedom, security 
and justice on their own. According to my story, our common model needs more 
care, consent, charity, curiosity and commitment, apparently requiring a rather 
radical development of our social science cognition to achieve. 
One possible interpretation of the grid-group theory in the terms of this 
conjecture might be as follows. The group axis relates to interpersonal (inter-
community) involvement, both in terms of intensity and extent.  In this 
conjecture, involvement is also dissected by type (motive) and transaction 
activity. The grid axis apparently relates to both the rules, conventions and 
institutional constraints on interpersonal interaction (here, the transactions 
systems themselves), and may also include ideas of the relative weights of public 
versus private interest (e.g. reciprocity). In other words, grid-group cultural 
theory might possibly be interpreted as a much reduced form of the present 
conjecture. Even a casual acquaintance with grid-group literature indicates that 
there remains some considerable debate about the exact nature of the group, and 
especially the grid axes of this theory (e.g. Mamadouh, op cit., especially p 
397ff), not to mention remaining scepticism of its general reliability or utility. 
A Conjecture on the Nature of Social Systems 
18 
Nevertheless, cultural theory clearly enjoys substantial success amongst a 
considerable cohort of social scientists. I suggest that some of the ideas in this 
conjecture might, at least, help to clarify and develop this already successful 
approach. 
 
Figure 1: A schematic representation of social systems 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
If approximately legitimate, this conjecture of institutional evolution implies that 
the apparent hegemony of the present common model is unsustainable. Barter, 
habit and fear are insufficient grounds for progressive human development.  Yet, 
to a very large extent our national and international institutions rely only on these 
fundamentals.  Education or other forms of persuasion of the truth of our present 
common model are quite simply incapable of reaching the goals we seek.  Some 
version of our common model might be a necessary condition for the pursuit of 
sensible and sensitive development and human contentment, but it is clearly not 
sufficient.  More importantly, the more educated and informed the world 
becomes, the less sufficient it is likely to be.  If we persist in believing that 
bribery, coercion, training or education are all we need to do to secure universal 
acceptance of western hegemony, we condemn ourselves to extinction.  This 
appears to be a counter-traditional if not counter-intuitive result, suggesting that 
this conjecture is worthy of more consideration and examination. 
At present, it is apparent that many communities and societies are not willing to 
grant that our rulers (rich governments, mighty multinational companies and 
powerful international organisations) are genuinely committed to general social 
progress, or ready to be openly and transparently curious, or sufficiently careful 
of our human (and thus planetary) inheritance.  To many, these trust-failures are 
the obvious consequence of primitive understandings. They reflect either more or 
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less deliberate ignorance or self-seeking exploitation of love, thought and 
charity.  In short, the traditional bureaucrats’ creed that the devil is in the detail is 
exactly wrong.  According to this account, however, life is in the detail; the devil 
is in the conception.   
No doubt there will be considerable dispute about the particular words (and 
associated concepts) chosen here to outline the nature of human institutional 
evolution.  Such semantic debate is clearly fundamental to developing this 
outline into a serious multi-discipline, (psychohistory? - Asimov, 1951ff,) so as 
to establish its consistency. In addition, further refinement and closer definition 
of the terms used here will be necessary to confront the outline proposed here 
with the evidence from the development of human societies and institutions, to 
establish the coherence of the story.  Furthermore, much more work needs to be 
done on understanding the essential mechanisms and processes through which 
institutions translate information into knowledge, and cooperate (perhaps too 
infrequently) to breed and grow understanding and wisdom. 
But the semantics themselves can only make sense when clearly and 
unequivocally linked through an appropriate grammar - which establishes the 
rules through which the concepts and constructs are connected so as to make 
sense, which is here taken as the logic of evolution.  Even then, the consequent 
sentences and paragraphs can only make serious sense if they seem to tell a 
credible and believable story.  The story itself is the emergent phenomenon.  It 
cannot be deduced from the parts, neither from the semantics nor the grammar.  
It emerges only as the words unfold in a sensible and comprehensible order.  
The fundamental problem facing our attempts to reconcile policy relevance with 
academic excellence is that our social sciences are fragmented and isolated from 
one another.  We cannot trade ideas and concepts because we operate in self-
contained disciplinary islands.  When we attempt to trade, we tend to resort to 
barter or war.  Our common models lack common understanding of the processes 
which generate what we see, so we argue about both our observations and 
interpretations. And we have been here before. Tarnas (1991, especially p27ff) 
observes that the Sophists of ancient Greece mediated the transition from an age 
of myth to an age of practical reason. However, “In such critical circumstances, 
the philosophical denial of absolute values and sophistical condemnation of stark 
opportunism seemed both to reflect and to exacerbate the problematic spirit of 
the times” (ibid., p 29).   
Are we caught now in a similar cusp between our age of practical reason and a 
future age of sustainable rationality?  If so, then the need for a more common 
story seems undeniable. Without it, we continue to condemn ourselves, and the 
societies we study and (presumably) hope to improve, to continued dispute and 
debate. The emergence of genuine and sustainable progress will then continue to 
be largely accidental, and rather unreliable. I strongly suggest that we ought to be 
able to do better than this, and to do so, we need to learn to trade and exchange 
our ideas and concepts more efficiently and effectively than we presently do. 
This conjecture is a modest attempt to provide a framework or theme within 
which we might try and develop such exchange, and hence breed and nurture 
more productive understandings of our human natures. 
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